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I. Introduction
Modern warfare has the potential to inflict enormous damage upon the natural environment. 
 In the post-Cold-War world few areas have suffered greater environmental harm from wartime 
military activities than the area in and around Iraq; two of the most extreme examples were inflicted 
by the former Iraqi government.  In the first Gulf War, Iraqi forces set fire to 600 of Kuwait’s oil 
wells, and uncapped or damaged 175 more.1  During the same conflict at least six million barrels of 
oil were deliberately discharged into the Persian Gulf,2 adding to the already considerable damage 
wrought by routine oil industry operations and the hundreds of attacks on tankers and oil facilities 
during the Iran-Iraq war.3  And following the unsuccessful Shiite rebellion of 1991, Saddam 
Hussein’s government drained the marshlands of Southern Iraq in a successful effort to destroy the 
lifestyle and culture of the Shiite Ma’Dan, or Marsh Arabs.4
The illegality of the Iraqi actions against the environment during the Gulf War, which
resulted in an unprecedented imposition of damages for environmental harm,5 has been fully 
1 ECONOMIST, The Spoils of War: What Can the Past Tell About the Effect of Military Conflict on 
the Environment? Mar. 27, 2003 [“Spoils of War”].
2 Spoils of War, supra note 1.
3
 See Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International 
Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (1997).
4 ECONOMIST, The Marsh Arabs of Iraq: Do They Want to Go Back in Time? June 5, 2002 
[“Marsh Arabs”]; Spoils of War, supra note 1.
5 See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); see also S.C. Res. 674, U.N. 
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991).
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discussed elsewhere.6  The plight of the Marsh Arabs has received less attention from legal scholars 
than perhaps it should, possibly owing to a lack of information about the region or to the obscurity 
of international law concerning domestic environmental damage.7  This article will attempt to 
address the legality of the actions against the Marsh Arabs and the wetlands in which they lived.
6
 On the damage to Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, see, e.g., Margaret Okordudu-Fubara, Oil in the 
Persian War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 123 (1991); Betsy 
Baker, Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 351 
(1993)(see esp. n.5, listing academic conferences on this topic); Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, 
Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law After the 
Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1995); Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of 
Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 
MIL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Florentino P. Feliciano, Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural 
Resources as War Measures: A Note on Some International Law Problems in the Gulf War, 14 
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 483 (1992); Philippe Sands, Moderator, Panel Discussion on the Gulf War: 
Environment As a Weapon, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 214 (1991); Marc Ross, Comment, 
Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat Intentional 
Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 515 (1992); Suzanne M. Bernard, Comment, 
Environmental Warfare: Iraq's Use of Oil Weapons During the Gulf Conflict, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REV.
106 (1993); Shilpi Gupta, Note, Iraq's Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 251 (1993); Mark T. Caggiano, Comment, The Legitimacy of Environmental 
Destruction in Modern Warfare: Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 479 (1993); Laura Edgerton, Note, Eco-Terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: 
Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable? 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 151 (1992);  
Stephanie N. Simonds, Note, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for 
International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165 (1992); Jesica E. Seacor, Note and Comment, 
Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y 481 
(1994).
7 The plight of the Marsh Arabs has been discussed or mentioned in several articles, however.  See, 
e.g., Michael Posner and Fiona McKay, The Iraqi Justice System: Challenges in Responding to 
Iraq's Past Abuses of Human Rights, 42 JUDGES' J. 14, 15 (2003); Suzette Brooks Masters, 
Environmentally Induced Migration: Beyond a Culture of Reaction, 14 GEORGETOWN IMM. L. J. 
855, 867-68 (2000); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: 
Mesopotamia and the International Law of Transboundary Waters, 10 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. J. 
PUBLIC L. 213, 219-20, 224 (1996). 
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II. The Marsh Arabs
Before the first Gulf War Southern Mesopotamia held southwestern Asia’s most extensive 
wetlands, at the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates.8  For thousands of years these wetlands, 
spreading out on all sides of the Tigris, the Euphrates and the Shatt al-Arab, had been occupied by 
the ancestors of the people known today as the Marsh Arabs, a culture uniquely adapted to the 
marsh environment.9  Today the Marsh Arabs, like a majority of Iraqis, are Shia Muslims.  In 1991, 
after the first Gulf War, the Marsh Arabs and other Shiites in southern Iraq rose up in an 
unsuccessful attempt to overthrow or at least throw off the control of the Hussein government.  The 
government responded not only with conventional military force but with an attack on the 
environment:  Over the next few years the government built a system of dams, dikes and canals to 
drain the wetlands, so that today only 7% of the original area remains.10  While the exact number of 
deaths and of persons displaced as a result will probably never be known, most sources give 
numbers of displaced persons between 200,000 and 400,000.11 A similar number may remain in the 
8 See, e.g., Colin Freeman, Marsh Arabs Reclaim Paradise, THE SCOTSMAN, August 16, 2003.  
The frequent references to “Eden” and “Paradise” in discussions of the Marsh Arabs reflect the 
belief that the Garden of Eden was located in the region.
9 See Freeman, supra note 8; Spoils of War, supra note 1; Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
10 Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
11 See, e.g., Marsh Arabs, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 8.  For a much more detailed 
description of the environmental campaign against the Marsh Arabs, see THE IRAQI 
MARSHLANDS: A HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY (Emma Nicholson & Peter Clark eds., 
Politico's Publishing, London 2002); see also John Fawcett & Victor Tanner, The Internally 
Displaced People of Iraq 29-32, 40, 51, 54 (Brookings Institution 2002).
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former marshes in a state of extreme poverty.12
Today the Mesopotamian wetlands are parched earth crusted with salt; the reeds are gone, 
and along with them the smooth-coated otter, the crested porcupine, the grey wolf, the Basrah reed 
warbler, important staging areas for migrating waterfowl, countless fish and invertebrates, and a 
crucial food supply for the fish of the Persian Gulf.13
III. The Legality of Iraq’s Actions Under International Law
At the time of its campaign against the Marsh Arabs, the government of Iraq was party to a 
number of international conventions bearing on its conduct.  In addition, there existed a relevant 
body of customary international law.  This section will examine which obligations under those 
treaties or under customary international law were violated by Iraq’s conduct.
A. Sources of International Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides a traditional 
starting point for examining the sources of international law:
international conventions, . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law, . . . the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, . . 
. judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations[.]14
12
 The Iraqi Marshlands: Can They Be Saved? Brookings Institution Forum, May 7, 2003
(remarks of Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne) available at 
http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/20030507marsh.htm (visited August 20, 2003). 
13 See “The Marsh Arabs and the Marshlands,” on the website of AMAR, a charity dedicated to 
assisting the Marsh Arabs: http://www.amarappeal.com/about5.htm (visited August 20, 2003).
14
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945), T.S. No. 993, 
3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052.
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The sources of law listed in the statute (other than international conventions) can, at the risk 
of oversimplification, be grouped together under the heading of "customary international law."
B. Conventional International Law: Treaties and Other International Agreements
For as long as there has been war, the environment has suffered from it.  Until very recently, 
however, conventional international law had not addressed the problem directly; environmental 
protection, where it existed at all, was contained in treaties dealing with other topics.  The past 
century has brought about a dramatic increase in the destructive power available to warring states 
and factions, and a growing worldwide awareness of the fragility of the natural environment.  
Weapons now exist, and are available to many countries, that could render the planet unsuitable for 
human life.15
The watershed event in the development of law regarding the protection of the environment 
during wartime was the American defoliation campaign during the Vietnam War.  The deliberate 
American ecocide in Vietnam brought an unprecedented degree of international attention to the 
problem of environmental destruction during wartime.16  Prior to that time environmental 
protection had been incidental to other international agreements regulating the conduct of war, 
15
 The supposed existence of such weapons in Iraq was offered by the governments of the United 
Kingdom and the United States as a justification for war with Iraq, ultimately resulting in 
considerable embarrassment for both governments.
16 See, e.g., Neil Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environment, and Human Rights, 
8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (1995); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment 
of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1997); 
Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action Against 
Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 126 (2000); Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate 
Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Greening" 
the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 793, 795-96 (1996).
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rather than a specific end in itself.  Between the Vietnam War and the first Gulf War, however, that 
portion of the jus in bello17 dealing with environmental protection evolved significantly.  A number 
of these post-Vietnam era treaties, and some earlier ones, may have some relevance to the question 
of the legality of Iraq’s conduct.
Pre-Vietnam era treaties did not deal specifically with the problem of environmental 
protection during wartime, but provided some protection directly.  Treaties of this nature that merit 
discussion here include the Convention against Genocide,18 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol19 and the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.20 Two agreements from the Vietnam war era that deal 
tangentially with environmental issues in a human rights context are the covenants on Economic 
and Cultural Rights21 and on Civil and Political Rights.22
In the next category are post-Vietnam era treaties that deal specifically with environmental 
damage during wartime.  Iraq is not a party to these agreements, but some of their provisions may 
have entered into customary international law.  These include the environmental modification treaty 
17
 The jus in bello is the body of international law pertaining to the conduct of war. 
18
 Genocide Convention, infra note 31.
19
 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other 
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, infra note 37.
20
 Geneva Convention I, infra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, infra note 39, art. 51; Geneva 
Convention III, infra note 39, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, infra note 39, art. 147.
21 International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, infra note 89.
22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, infra note 90.
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ENMOD, 23 Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 24 and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.25
In the final category are several environmental agreements to which Iraq is a party.  These 
agreements deal with peacetime environmental issues, not with warfare, and their applicability to 
the situation of the Marsh Arabs is limited.  
C. Note on Customary International Law
Before discussing the treaties, it is necessary to take a preliminary look at customary 
international law.  General rules of customary international law may bear on the lawfulness or lack 
thereof of Iraq’s actions; in addition, provisions of some of the treaties may have entered into 
customary international law, and thus Iraq may have been bound by those provisions even if it was 
not a party to the treaty.  
Customary international law is generally described as the practice of states undertaken out 
of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris.  Of the sources of law mentioned in Article 38(1) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice,26 all but the first could conceivably fall within the 
23
 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [ENMOD].
24
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16 
I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [Protocol II].  Neither the United States nor Iraq 
is a party to either protocol, but portions of both may have become customary international law.
25
 Rome Statute, infra note 80.
26
 These are “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, . . . the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, . . . judicial decisions, and the teachings of 
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category of customary international law, although "general principles of law" have traditionally 
been seen as a third category of public international law.  However, they can also be seen as 
"supplemental rules" or a "secondary source of law."27  Judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most qualified publicists are merely a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."28
In any event, judicial decisions and, to the extent that a state actually observes them, general 
principles of law are state practice undertaken from a sense of legal obligation, and thus form the 
basis for normative expectations.
D. Conventions Pertaining to the Conduct of War and to Which Iraq is A Party
The Genocide Convention
The attack on the southern Mesopotamian wetlands was probably the largest attack on the 
environment itself since Operation Ranch Hand, the American defoliation campaign in Vietnam, 
thirty years earlier.  As in Vietnam, the environmental damage was not incidental; the purpose in 
both cases was to effect a significant change in the natural environment.  But the best analogy may 
not be to Vietnam, but to the deliberate extermination of the buffalo29 during the wars between the 
United States government and the Plains Indians in the nineteenth century.30  There, as in the 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations[.]” See supra note 14.
27 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§102(4), cmt. l & Reporter's Note 7 (1987).
28
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 14.
29
 Technically, the animal referred to here is not a buffalo but a North American bison, but 
everyone except hardcore zoology geeks calls it a buffalo.
30
 This similarity was not lost on the Iraqi government: See note 47, infra, and accompanying 
text.
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Mesopotamian wetlands, the object was genocide: the deliberate eradication of a people and a 
culture by alteration of the environment upon which that people and that culture depended; or, in 
the words of the Genocide Convention, “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”31
The wars against the Plains Indians predated the Convention by many decades, and in any 
event are outside the scope of this discussion. The destruction of the Marsh Arabs’ habitat was 
within the scope of the Convention, at a time when Iraq had agreed to be bound by its terms. 32  It is 
still possible that some of the person responsible for designing and implementing the policy may be 
brought to trial under Article VI of the Convention.  However, no steps have yet been taken in that 
direction.33
The Hague and Geneva Regimes
For decades prior to the Vietnam War principles of international law had been in place that 
31 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 
Dec. 9, 1948, in force Jan. 12, 1951.  Iraq acceded to the Convention on Jan. 20, 1959; the 
United States became a party by ratification on November 25, 1988, forty years after signing the 
Convention.  See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty1gen.htm (visited August 20, 2003).
32
 The United States’ ratification includes two reservations and five understandings.  
Understanding 4 addresses situations of this sort: “[A]cts in the course of armed conflicts 
committed without the specific intent required by article II are not sufficient to constitute 
genocide as defined by this Convention.” United Nations Treaty Collection, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty1gen.htm (visited August 20, 2003).  Iraq’s accession 
to the Convention contains no such provision.
33
 The ecocide-as-genocide argument is explained cogently and convincingly in a Jurist piece by 
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Iraqi Campaign Against the Marsh Arabs: Ecocide as Genocide, 
January 31, 2003, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew92.php (visited August 
20, 2003).
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should have prevented Operation Ranch Hand.  The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg stated that 
"the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy."34 While weakening the forces of the enemy (by denying them forest 
cover) was the objective of Operation Ranch Hand, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
provided that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."35
Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Convention prohibited the use of “poison or poisoned weapons,"36
although this was probably not intended to apply to poisons used against plants rather than people.  
The use of poison gas during World War I in violation of the 1907 Convention led to the more 
effective 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol.37  In the 78 years since the adoption of the Protocol poison gas 
has rarely been used,38 and its use has almost always been condemned as a violation of international 
law.
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949,39 embodying the new awareness of human rights 
34
 Cited in William A. Wilcox, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U.L.J. 299, 303 
(1993).
35
 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 
Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter "1907 Hague Convention"].  The Convention was the fourth of 
thirteen to emerge from the 1907 Hague Peace Conference and is thus known as "Hague IV."
36
 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 35, art. 23.
37
 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other 
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061.
38
 One of the rare violators has been Iraq, which is believed to have used poison gas in its war 
with Iran and against its rebellious Kurdish population, although the latter use was internal and 
thus possibly outside the scope of the 1925 Protocol.  Some writers are of the opinion that Iraq's 
release and burning of oil violated the 1925 Protocol.  See, e.g., Okordudu-Fubara, supra note 6, at 
190-91.
39
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the 
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that followed World War II, also contained early glimmerings of modern concepts of environmental 
protection during wartime.  The Conventions prohibit the extensive destruction of property, when 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly and not justified by military necessity.40  They also prohibit 
willfully causing great suffering or injury to health.41
Common Article 3
  At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference at which the four Geneva Conventions42 were 
adopted, there was considerable debate between those parties who wished the protections in the 
Conventions to apply to all armed conflicts, and those who wished it to apply only to conflicts 
between states.43  The result was Common Article 3, included in all four conventions.  The portion 
of Common Article 3 that may have some bearing on the situation of the Marsh Arabs provides 
that:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Geneva Conventions I, II, II and IV, respectively].
40
 Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 39, art. 51; 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 147.
41
 Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 39, art. 51; 
Geneva Convention III, supra note 39, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 147.
42 Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, supra note 39.
43 See Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and Its Relation to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AMERICAN U.L.REV. 9, 
11-12 (1983).
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one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as 
a minimum, the following provisions: 
    (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any 
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture…44
An unknown number of Marsh Arabs were killed outright by Iraqi forces during the 
drainage operations.45  At this time the “hostilities” were largely over, and most or all of those 
killed would have been taking no active part.  And depriving people of their homes and 
livelihoods can hardly be considered humane treatment.  But the protections in Common Article 
3 are considerably less extensive than those contained in the remainder of the four Conventions 
and applicable to international armed conflicts, and more or less co-extensive with the 
protections contained in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.46 While they may address 
some deprivations of individual rights during the drainage campaign, they do not address the 
larger issue of the campaign itself.
44 Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 39, art. 3; Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 39, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 39, art. 3.
45 See Fawcett & Tanner, supra note 11, at 31.
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, infra note 90, arts. 4(2), 6, 7 & 10.
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The Iraqi response to allegations of genocide and violations of the Geneva Conventions 
was cynical: "America wiped the Red Indians off the face of the earth and nobody raised an 
eyebrow."47 This followed an earlier propaganda campaign depicting the Marsh Arabs as 
“monkey-faced” outsiders.48
E. Conventions Pertaining to the Conduct of War with Specifically Environmental 
Provisions and to which Iraq is not a Party
ENMOD
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD)49 was intended to prohibit the hostile use of large-scale 
environmental modification such as the deforestation practiced by the United States in Vietnam, as 
well as possible new forms of environmental modification including weather control and deliberate 
destruction of the ozone layer.50
ENMOD requires that the effect on the environment, in order to fall under the treaty, be 
"widespread, long-lasting, or severe."51  Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament defines the terms as follows:  "Widespread" means extending over "several hundred 
square kilometers"; "long-lasting" means "approximately a season"; "severe" means causing 
47
 1992 statement of then Parliamentary Speaker Saadi Mehdi Saleh, quoted in Fawcett & 
Tanner, supra note 11, at 32.  It’s hard to know just where to begin taking issue with this remark, 
but the comparison is apt, if hardly admirable.
48
 Fawcett & Tanner, supra note 11, at 29.
49
 ENMOD, supra note 23.
50
 For a much more complete discussion of ENMOD, see Schmitt, supra note 16, at 82-85.
51
 ENMOD, supra note 23, art. 1.
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"serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other 
assets."52
The damage to the Mesopotamian wetlands meets all of these requirements.  The marshes, 
which had covered an area of nearly 11,000 square kilometers in 1970, had shrunk to 1,084 square 
kilometers by 2000 and 759 by 2002.53 The damage has lasted for many seasons and may be 
permanent, although plans for restoration have been proposed.  And there has been serious 
disruption to human life and natural and economic resources: Hundreds of thousands of people 
have been forced to leave their homes and live as impoverished refugees either within Iraq or across 
the border in Iran.  There has been widespread loss of animal and plant life, with disruption to 
fisheries and water supplies.
Note that ENMOD does not require that the disruption be widespread, long-lasting, and
severe; any one of the three is sufficient to constitute a violation.  However, Iraq is not a party to 
ENMOD; it signed the treaty in 1977 but has not ratified it or deposited instruments of accession.  It 
is thus not bound by the treaty unless its provisions have attained the status of customary 
international law through widespread observation in the practice of states out of a sense of legal 
obligation.
The expanded definitions in Understanding I, at least, have not attained that status; many of 
the parties to ENMOD, in fact, have dissented from them.54  Thus, Understanding I does not 
52
 Yuzon, supra note 16, at 806, citing Understandings I & II of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 377-78 (Adam Roberts & Richard 
Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989).
53
 UNEP, "Jardin de l'Eden" au sud de l'Irak risque de disparaître d'ici 5 ans, Mar. 22, 2003, 
available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/sustainable/tigris/marshlands/index.fr.php (visited 
August 22, 2003).
54
 Yuzon, supra note 16, at 807.
Aaron Schwabach
July 13, 2004
Envtl. Damage in Yugoslavia
15
represent a consensus even among the parties as to the meaning of these terms.  
The language in the treaty itself, prohibiting military use of "widespread, long-lasting, or 
severe" environmental modification, may have become customary international law.  Warring 
states, even those not bound by ENMOD, have for the most part refrained from such acts.55 When 
they have not refrained (as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not), the action has generally been met with 
universal disapproval; thus, there seems to exist an international sense of legal obligation to refrain 
from strategic or tactical use of widespread, long-lasting, or severe environmental modification.  
However, ENMOD confines itself to prohibiting the use of such techniques by one state against 
another state; a purely internal conflict is outside the scope of the treaty.56
Protocol I
Protocol I was drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 1974 and 
1977.  Iraq is not a party to Protocol I.  The United States, which signed the Protocol in 1978 but 
has not yet ratified it, takes the position that much of Protocol I is customary law and thus binding.  
For the most part this seems to be borne out in the practice of states.
In the post-World War II world conflicts within states have been far more common than 
conflicts between states, although the line is often very difficult to draw.  The dispute over how to 
treat internal armed conflicts that had led to the adoption of Common Article 3 in the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions arose again in the negotiations leading to the adoption of Protocols I and II. 
 Many countries proposed that there should be little or no difference in the treatment of internal 
and international armed conflicts.  Norway, for example, successfully urged the adoption of a 
55
 The United States, incidentally, is a party to ENMOD.
56
 ENMOD, supra note 23, art. I(1).
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provision applying the provisions of the four 1949 Conventions and Protocol I to anti-colonial 
wars:
57
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.58
There is considerable ambiguity here: At what point does an armed conflict 
become a struggle against colonial domination or alien occupation?  The Marsh Arabs 
were not subject to colonial domination or alien occupation in the traditional sense.  They 
do not (or did not) possess national aspirations and national liberation movements as do, 
for example, the Kurds of northern Iraq.  A regime that characterized the Marsh Arabs as 
“monkey-faced” and “not real Iraqis”59 is certainly discriminatory, but whether it is racist 
depends on what is meant by “race” and “racist.”
“Racist regimes” was, at the time of its inclusion, a specific reference to the 
governments of South Africa and what was then Rhodesia.  The commentary on Protocol 
57
 Lysaght, supra note 43, at 9-10.
58
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 1(4). 
59 See Fawcett & Tanner, supra note 11, at 29; see  note 48, supra.
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I refers to “minority racist regimes,”60 but also states that the term can refer to “if not the 
existence of two completely distinct peoples, at least a rift within a people which ensures 
hegemony of one section in accordance with racist ideas.”61 While the Marsh Arabs are 
not of a separate race from the majority of Iraqis or from the ruling religious (but not 
racial) minority during the Hussein years, there is evidently a rift between them and the 
ruling group, and that group’s hegemony over the Marsh Arabs, if not over the country as 
a whole, appeared to be based on racist ideas.
Most of the environmental protection provided by Protocol I is, like all such 
protection previously, indirect.  Protocol I also contains direct environmental protections, 
however.  Article 35(1) reiterates the Hague Convention principle that "In any armed 
conflict, the right of the Parties to the Conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited[.]"62 Article 35(3) makes this provision specifically applicable to the 
environment: "It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, 
or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural 
environment."
At first glance the wording might appear identical to that of ENMOD, but the choice of 
conjunction makes an enormous difference: ENMOD prohibits techniques having “widespread, 
60
 Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 72, ¶80.
61
 Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 72, ¶112.
62
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art 35(1).
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long-lasting or severe” effects, while Protocol I aims to prevent “widespread, long-term, and
severe” damage.  The Protocol I standard is thus much higher than the ENMOD standard: All three 
elements must be met, rather than merely one.
There is no reason to assume that the definitions of "widespread, long-term, and severe" 
contained in Understanding I, which as noted are not customary international law, are applicable to 
Protocol I.  On the contrary, the commentary to Article 55, which uses the same phrase, states that 
“In the final debate several delegations indicated that in their opinion the words ‘widespread, 
long-term and severe’ do not have the same meaning in the Protocol as the corresponding words 
in [ENMOD].”63 The United States delegation expressed the opinion that Article 35 governed a 
wider scope of activity than ENMOD, as it covered harm inflicted upon the environment by any 
means rather than only use or modification of the environment itself as a weapon.64 By almost 
any conceivable measure, however, the damage done to the homeland of the Marsh Arabs seems 
likely not only to meet but to exceed the minimum threshold for all three elements.
Article 54 of Protocol I prohibits attacking, destroying, or rendering useless "objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," including drinking water supplies and 
installations and agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs.65 While the draining of the 
wetlands undoubtedly affected water supplies and production of foodstuffs, the wetlands and 
watercourses may not be “objects” within the meaning of Article 51.  It is worth noting, though, 
63
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, ¶2136, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COMART?openview  (visited August 24, 2003).
64
 Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 63, ¶1450; see generally ¶¶1447-58.
65
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(2).
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that the French text of Protocol I uses the same word for “objects” in Article 54 and “supplies” in 
Article 69: "biens indispensables" for “indispensable objects” and " biens essentiels" for “supplies 
essential [to the survival of the civilian population].”66
In addition, the destruction of the wetlands did have “the specific purpose of denying them 
for their sustenance value to the civilian population” and did "leave the civilian population with 
such inadequate food and water as to cause its starvation or force its movement," as prohibited by 
Article 54.67 The destruction was also carried out as a reprisal, also prohibited: “These objects shall 
not be made the object of reprisals.”68
Article 55 of the Protocol is aimed purely at protection of the environment and of civilian 
populations dependent upon it:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term, and severe damage.  This protection includes a prohibition 
of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended to or may be expected 
to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health 
or survival of the population.69
In addition, “Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.”
70
 This treaty provision was designed to prohibit exactly the type of harm that occurred in southern 
Iraq: Retaliation against a civilian population by damaging the environment upon which that 
population depended for its health and survival.
66
 Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 63, ¶2086.
67
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art 54(2).
68
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(4).
69
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 55(1).
70
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 55(2).
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Thus Iraq would at first appear to be in violation of the terms of Protocol I.  And if, as 
seems likely, the environmental provisions of Protocol I have become part of customary 
international law, Iraq would seem to be in violation of those provisions even though it is not a 
party to the Protocol, unless it has been a consistent dissenter.
But if the Marsh Arabs were not struggling against a racist regime in exercise of their right 
of self-determination, Protocol I will be inapplicable: The draining of the wetlands and attacks on 
the Marsh Arabs happened largely within the borders of Iraq.  While the portion of the wetlands 
lying in Iran has also, inevitably, been affected, those effects seem to have been incidental; the 
target of the attack was within Iraq.71 A separate document, Protocol II, applies to armed conflicts 
within the borders of a single state.
d. Protocol II
Protocol II was adopted to cover non-international conflicts that were not 
struggles against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes.72  The coverage 
of Common Article 3, Protocol II and Protocol I can be thought of as three concentric 
circles.  The outer, largest circle is Common Article 3; it applies to all non-international 
armed conflicts.  The middle circle is Protocol II; it applies to non-international armed 
71
 This does not mean that Iran has no recourse against Iraq for damage to its territory; traditional 
principles of state responsibility would still apply.  See notes 116-118, infra, and accompanying 
text.
72 See Protocol II, supra note 24, Art. I, and International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Commentary on Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, ¶¶ 
4446-79, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COMART?openview (visited August 24, 2003).
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conflicts in which the rebels “exercise such control over a part of [the state’s] territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement” 
Protocol II.73 The inner circle is Protocol I; it applies only to international conflicts and to 
conflicts “in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination[.]”74
Conceivably the inner two circles are not concentric, but overlapping; there may be anti-
colonial rebel groups that do not exercise control over territory sufficient to allow them to 
implement Protocol II, but would nonetheless be covered by Protocol I and the four 1949 
Conventions.
Although the protections of Protocol II are less extensive than those of Protocol I, 
Protocol II does contain some measures protecting the environment.  Article 14 of 
Protocol II is similar to Article 54(1) and (2) of Protocol I, but somewhat more narrowly 
worded.  Article 14 provides:
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore 
prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, 
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water 
installations and supplies and irrigation works.75
In contrast, Article 54 of Protocol I provides:
73
 Protocol II, art. I(1).
74
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. I(4).
75
 Protocol II, supra note 24, art. 14.
Aaron Schwabach
July 13, 2004
Envtl. Damage in Yugoslavia
22
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.76
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the 
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and 
irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to 
the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to 
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.77
The minor textual difference has significant consequences for the Marsh Arabs.  
Protocol I, possibly inapplicable to their situation, places the prohibition of destroying 
indispensable objects in a separate numbered paragraph from the prohibition of 
starvation.  That separate paragraph elaborates further: It is illegal not merely to destroy 
these objects to starve the civilian population, but also to destroy them to cause the 
civilians to move away or for any other reason.
If Protocol I were applicable to the situation, a violation could be proved by 
showing that the marshes were an indispensable object.  While this might be difficult, 
under Protocol II there is a second hurdle: The motive of the Hussein government must 
have been to starve the civilian population, rather than to injure them in some other way.  
(Note, though, that the exceptions in Articles 54(1) and 54(3) of Protocol I do not apply 
to Article 14 of Protocol II.)
Even more distressing is the absence in Protocol II of any specifically 
76
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(1).
77
 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 54(2).
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environmental provision analogous to Article 55 of Protocol I.  There is, however, a 
prohibition on the forced movement of civilians in Article 17 of Protocol II:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to 
the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons 
so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures 
shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory 
conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected 
with the conflict.
This provision seems to have been violated.  The Marsh Arabs were forced to 
relocate by the destruction of their environment, and in some cases at gunpoint and by the 
burning of their villages.  This was certainly not for their security.  The conflict had 
already ended, so there could not have been any immediate military necessity, although 
the Hussein government might have imagined a long-term necessity.  And “all possible 
measures” were not taken to ensure that the Marsh Arabs were “received under 
satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition,” as their situation 
today shows.
However, Iraq is not a party to Protocol I or II, and even if the provisions of the 
Protocols have, as the U.S. maintains, entered into customary law, Iraq has in all 
probability been a consistent dissenter, preventing the formation of any normative 
expectation that Iraq will act in accordance with the Protocols or feels obligated to do so.
While countries such as Norway may feel that a single standard should apply to all 
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armed conflicts, a cynic might observe that the probability that Norway will suffer an 
internal armed conflict at any time in the foreseeable future is remote.  Countries that are 
more likely to experience such conflicts, including Iraq, may have a greater stake in the 
formation of rules regarding those conflicts.  Nonetheless, it is possible that the Geneva 
Conventions are jus cogens – a norm from which Iraq cannot derogate,78 although that 
may not be true of the 1977 Protocols.79
The Rome Statute
The Rome Statute establishes a permanent International Criminal Court to adjudicate 
crimes against humanity.80  Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute prohibits 
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
78 See generally, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: 
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 81 (2001).
79 See, e.g., HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 195 (1990): “It might, 
in the light of the very large number of states party to them, be argued that the whole of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, although not of the 1977 Additional Protocols, have been absorbed into the 
body of jus cogens.” McCoubrey’s approach to jus cogens may be somewhat more skeptical than 
that of many scholars, although a similar or greater skepticism is expressed by many 
governments.  The debate over the existence, nature and extent of jus cogens norms is extensive, 
and beyond the scope of this paper.
80
 Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), entered 
into force July 1, 2002.  For more information, see http://www.un.org/law/icc/ (visited August 23, 
2003).
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anticipated.81
Iraq’s attack on the southern Mesopotamian wetlands was launched not only with 
the knowledge but also with the intention that it would cause “widespread, long-term, and 
severe damage to the natural environment.” (Note that the standard is identical to that in 
Articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I.)82 It certainly seems excessive in relation to any military 
advantage obtained.  Iraq, however, is not a party to the Rome Statute.83
F. Environmental Treaties to which Iraq Is a Party
In addition to the treaties discussed above dealing specifically with wartime environmental 
damage, none of which Iraq is a party to, Iraq is also a party to 50 treaties with environmental 
provisions.84 Of these, there are a few that merit at least cursory examination in a discussion of the 
Marsh Arabs and the southern Mesopotamian wetlands:85 the Convention Concerning the 
81
 Rome Statute, supra note 80, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
82 See notes 62-65, supra, and accompanying text.
83
 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,  
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (visited 
August 23, 2003)
84
 ENTRI: Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators, Iraq Country Summary, 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entri/countryProfile.jsp (visited August 22, 2003).  Iraq 
has also signed but not ratified two environmental treaties, one of which is ENMOD, supra note 
23.  Iraq has also, along with 80 other former members out of a total of 95, denounced one treaty: 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (June 17, 1960), text available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entri/texts/acrc/solas60.txt.html (visited August 22, 2003).
85
 Iraq is not a party to the Ramsar Wetlands Convention (Feb. 2, 1971), 11 I.L.M. 963 (1972).
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Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,86 the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea,87 the International Plant Protection Convention,88 the International Covenant on 
Economic and Cultural Rights,89 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,90 the 
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution,91 and the Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from 
Land-Based Sources.92
Three of these can be dismissed fairly quickly.  The International Plant Protection 
Convention is aimed at preventing the spread of plant diseases and protecting cultivated plants, 
not at protecting wild vegetation and plant habitat: “This Convention shall have particular 
reference to pests and diseases of importance to international trade.”93  And although the 
86 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (Nov. 16, 
1972), T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 27 U.N.T.S. 37, 11 I.L.M. 1358 (1972)[World Heritage Convention].
87 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 10, 1982; in force Nov. 16, 1994), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF 62/122, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
88 International Plant Protection Convention, Art. II(3) (Dec. 6, 1951), Apr. 3, 1952, 23 U.S.T. 
2767, 150 U.N.T.S. 67.
89 International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights (Jan. 3, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
90 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
91 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
from Pollution (Apr. 24, 1978), 1140 U.N.T.S. 133, 17 I.L.M. 511 (1978)[Kuwait Convention].
92 Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based 
Sources (Feb. 21, 1990; in force 1993)(copy on file with author)[Protocol to Kuwait Convention].
93
 International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 88, art. II(3).
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destruction of the wetlands is certain to cause an increase in marine pollution in the northern 
Persian Gulf, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not address shore-based 
coastal marine pollution. Pollution of this sort is addressed by the Convention for the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources94, to which Iraq is not a party, and by the Kuwait 
Convention95 and its Protocol on Pollution from Land-Based Sources.96
The third, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage97 allows the designation of certain sites of cultural significance, natural significance or 
both as World Heritage Sites, and sets up a fund to provide assistance in preserving these sites.  
The lower Mesopotamian wetlands are not designated as a World Heritage Site.98 A designated 
site, Ashur, is threatened by a proposed dam and has been added to UNESCO’s list of World 
Heritage Sites in Danger.99 Iraq’s overall program of hydraulic and hydrologic engineering, 
which threatens Ashur, has also destroyed the southern Mesopotamian wetlands.  However, even 
94
 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources (June 4, 1974), 
13 I.L.M. 352 (1974).
95
 Kuwait Convention, supra note 91.
96 Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 92.
97 World Heritage Convention, supra note 86.
98
 The World Heritage List may be viewed at http://whc.unesco.org/heritage.htm (visited August 
23, 2003).  Somewhat surprisingly, considering Iraq’s wealth of archaeological sites, only two 
World Heritage Sites are listed for Iraq.
99
 Ashur is described at http://whc.unesco.org/sites/1130.htm (visited August 23, 2003); the list 
of World Heritage Sites in Danger may be viewed at http://whc.unesco.org/toc/mainf4.htm (visited 
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this expanded view does not mean that Iraq has violated or is likely to violate any obligations 
under the Convention.  
The Convention imposes specific responsibilities on states with regard to natural or 
cultural heritage located in the territory of other states: Each State Party to this Convention 
undertakes not to take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the 
cultural and natural heritage … situated on the territory of other States Parties to this 
Convention.”100 In contrast, with regard to cultural and natural heritage in their own territory, 
states are subject to a somewhat more vague exhortation to “ensur[e] the identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and 
natural heritage… and situated on its territory[.]”101
The Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution provides that “The Contracting States shall take all appropriate 
measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution caused by discharges from land reaching the Sea 
Area whether water-borne, air-borne or directly from the coast including outfalls and 
pipelines.”102 While this at first seems more likely to be relevant to the situation of the Marsh 
Arabs and the southern Mesopotamian marshes, in fact it imposes little actual responsibility on 
August 23, 2003).
100
 World Heritage Convention, supra note 86, art. 6(3).
101
 World Heritage Convention, supra note 86, art. 4.
102 Kuwait Convention, supra note 91, art. VI.
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Iraq.  Iraq is required to take “all appropriate measures,” not “all possible measures” or “all 
necessary measures.”103
The 1990 Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from 
Land-Based Sources104 adds a requirement of environmental impact assessment for activities 
likely to cause pollution below the saltwater line105 and requires cooperation between states in 
the event of pollution from a transboundary watercourse such as the lower Mesopotamian 
wetlands and the Shatt al-Arab.106 It also provides that “Contracting States shall ensure that 
recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems for prompt and adequate 
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the Marine Environment 
by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.”107 This may be helpful to Iraq’s injured 
neighbors, but provides little benefit to the Marsh Arabs.
The damage to the wetlands may itself be a polluting activity, leading to a short-term 
increase in the amount of organic matter discharged into the Persian Gulf with consequent 
103
 For a discussion of the significance of these and related differences in wording, see, e.g., 
Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Users of 
International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the Interests of Developing 
Upper Riparians, 33 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 257, 272-73 (1998).
104
 Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 92.
105
 Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 92, art. VIII(1).
106
 Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 92, art. XI(1).
107
 Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 92, art. XII(1).
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eutrophication.  The removal of the filtering capacity of the wetlands will also lead to an increase 
in the quantity of pollutants from other sources ultimately reaching the gulf.
While the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol may provide some recourse for Iraq’s 
neighbors injured by increased marine pollution, they provide none for the Marsh Arabs. The 
suffering of the Marsh Arabs is the result of the destruction of the marshes, not the result of any 
consequent pollution of the marine environment.
G. The Human Rights Covenants
The relevant portions of the International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights108
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights109 are identical.  Article 1(2) of each 
convention provides that 
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.110
Article 25 of the Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights and Article 47 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are also identical: “Nothing in the present Covenant 
108 International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, supra note 108.
109 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 109; the Covenant also contains 
guarantees of rights identical or analogous to those in Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.  See supra note 46.
110 International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, supra note 108, art. I(2); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 109, art. I(2).
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shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully 
and freely their natural wealth and resources.”111
These provisions illustrate the insoluble problem inherent in the idea of collective 
rights: What is a “people”? Are the Iraqis a “people”? If so, may they not exploit the 
waters of the Tigris, the Euphrates and the Shatt al-Arab as they see fit, even to the 
detriment of some subset of the Iraqi people?  Are the Marsh Arabs a “people”? What if 
some Marsh Arabs actually believe the wetlands should be drained, or benefit from it?  
Who speaks for the Iraqi “people” or the Marsh Arab “people”?  If the Marsh Arabs are 
not part of the Iraqi “people,” then by extension the Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, 
Turkomans, minority Sunni Arabs, and fragmented and disempowered Shiite Arabs, 
among others, are not part of the Iraqi “people,” either; any multicultural state such as 
Iraq must lack a cultural identity as a “people.”
Collective or third-generation rights are most often discussed in relation to the rights of 
indigenous or minority “peoples,” such as the Marsh Arabs.  But the right to sovereignty over 
natural resources is generally discussed in relation to the rights of states and national populations, 
such as Iraq and the Iraqis.  Customary international law probably recognizes no collective rights 
other than the right to existence (addressed by the Genocide Convention112) and the right to self-
111 International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, supra note 108, art. 25; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 109, art. 47.
112 See notes 30-33, supra, and accompanying text.
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determination,113 both of which were violated by the Hussein government’s actions.  Debating 
these issues may provide hours of entertainment for academics,114 but as a practical matter it 
means that the environmental provisions of these two covenants are sufficiently ambiguous to 
provide little useful guidance.  If the Marsh Arabs are a “people” within the meaning of the 
natural resource provisions of the Conventions, however, they have certainly been deprived of 
their means of subsistence.
H. Customary International Law
In addition to the treaties mentioned above to which Iraq is not a party but which may have 
entered into customary international law, there are some general principles of customary 
international law that may be applicable to the destruction of the southern Mesopotamian wetlands. 
113 See, e.g., Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People’s Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining the 
Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 INDIANA L.J. 673, 724 (1996).
114
 For some thoughtful discussions of these issues, see, e.g., PETER R. BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS: 
UNIVERSALITY IN PRACTICE (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Maila Stivens, Introduction: 
Gender Politics and the Reimagining of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND GENDER POLITICS: ASIA- PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 17 (Anne-Marie Hilsdon et al. eds., 2000); 
Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices from 
the Margins, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 373 (2000); Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting 
Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating Developing Countries, 4 YALE HUMAN 
RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 25 (2001); Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human 
Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L.R. 1095 (2000); Li-
ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: 'Promises to Keep and Miles to go 
Before I Sleep,' 2 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J 1 (1999); Prudence E. Taylor, 
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 Most such law deals entirely with relations between states, however.  It might thus provide a 
remedy to Iran for damage to its portion of the wetlands, but none to the Iraqi Marsh Arabs.
Customary law might, however, provide guidance in defining terms such as "military necessity" and 
"widespread, long-term and severe."
The Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention incorporates customary international 
law to fill any lacunae in the treaty regime governing state conduct during wartime:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued. . . the inhabitants 
and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law 
of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.115
Thus treaties may derogate from customary international law, but in the absence of such provisions 
the rules of customary international law are binding on the parties to the Hague Convention.  Note 
also that the Convention itself has attained, through widespread observance or at least aspiration, 
the status of customary international law.  A certain amount of bootstrapping thus results in a 
universal body of customary international law on the topic, equally binding on all nations.
Customary International Environmental Law
Customary international law deals with transboundary rather than domestic environmental 
harm.116  The fundamental principle in this area of law is that each state has a duty not to allow its 
115
 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 35, pmbl.
116
 For a fuller exposition of the problems in some of these areas, see, e.g., Aaron Schwabach, 
Diverting the Danube: the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute & International Freshwater Law, 14 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 290, 323-40 (1996).
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territory to be used so as to injure that of another.117 Principle 21 of the United Nations' Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment, an aspirational document now widely accepted as a 
statement of customary international law, provides that states have the "sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies," but along with this right comes 
the "responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."118 (The 
United States and others hold the view that Principle 21 is not applicable to wartime environmental 
damage.119
There is considerably less evidence of international custom when the destruction takes place 
within a single country.  Principle 21 would seem to excuse such destruction as an exercise of the 
sovereign right to exploit resources.  If, however, the Marsh Arabs are a different “people” from the 
other Iraqis, their situation may be analogous to that of an occupied territory.  During World War II, 
for example, German civilian officials in occupied Poland were charged with "ruthless exploitation 
of Polish forestry" including "the wholesale cutting of Polish timber to an extent far in excess of 
what was necessary to preserve the timber resources of the country."120 The Committee of the 
117 See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941), reprinted in 35 
AM.J.INT'L L. 684 (1941); Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 21 (Apr. 9, 1949) (determination on 
the merits); Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards (1957), digested in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 
156 (1959).
118 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972), Principle 21.  See also World Charter for Nature, Oct. 28, 1982, G.A. 
Res. 37/7 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51, 22 I.L.M. 455 
(1983); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N.Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26(vol. I)(1992), 31 I.L.M. 874.
119 See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 6, at 445.
120
 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948).
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United Nations War Crimes Commission found that prima facie existence of a war crime had been 
shown and nine of the officials were listed as accused war criminals.121
Germany, however, had invaded Poland and was an enemy occupying power at the time.  It 
may not be possible to stretch the definition of occupied territory to cover the homeland of the 
Marsh Arabs.
Customary International Law Regarding "Military Necessity"
The German officials who looted Poland’s forest did not have any immediate military 
necessity for doing so, however.  Customary international law on environmental harm recognizes 
an exception for military necessity.  Excessive environmental damage may be excused if it 
reasonably appeared necessary to the decision maker at the time the action was undertaken.122
The use of the military necessity exception is limited by the principles of proportionality, 
humanity, discrimination, and chivalry.  The principle of chivalry relates to the use of subterfuge 
and is not likely to arise in an environmental context.  The principle of proportionality, on the other 
hand, is always at issue when questions of military necessity for inflicting environmental damage 
arise.
Proportionality requires that the force used be proportional to the desired objective.123  For 
121 HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
LAWS OF WAR 496 (1948)
122 See, e.g., United States v. List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1296 (1947-48).  See also generally W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of 
War, 32 A.F.L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).  Note that while this "reasonable commander" standard may 
provide protection for individual military officers in war crimes trials, it is not necessarily a defense 
to state liability.
123 See, eg., Yuzon, supra note 16, at 810.
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example, the 1938 destruction of the Huayuankow Dike by Nationalist forces during the Japanese 
invasion of China was disproportional: The subsequent flooding killed several thousand Japanese 
soldiers and succeeded in halting the Japanese advance in the region, but it also killed 
approximately 750,000 Chinese civilians – probably the greatest loss of life ever caused by a single 
human action – and caused untold economic damage.124
Humanity requires that military forces avoid inflicting suffering, injury, or destruction 
beyond that actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military objectives.125 The 
destruction of the Huayuankow dike violated the principle of humanity as well.126 Discrimination 
requires that attackers distinguish military targets from civilian ones.127
The Iraqi actions seem to have violated all three principles.  The destruction of the wetlands 
was disproportional to the goal of eliminating a handful of impoverished and already defeated 
rebels.  Enormous suffering, injury and destruction was inflicted on the Marsh Arab population as a 
whole; the military goal of capturing the last few rebels could have been achieved with considerably 
less destruction.  And the vast majority of Marsh Arabs, and even the majority of villages, must 
have been uninvolved in the rebellion; there was no apparent attempt made to distinguish between 
civilian and rebel individuals or villages, however.
124 See, e.g., Caggiano, supra  note 6, at n. 73.
125 See, e.g., Yuzon, supra note 16, at 812.
126
 Frederick M. Lorenz, Protection of Water Facilities Under International Law 11 (UNESCO 
Research Paper 2003)(copy on file with author), available at 
webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pdf/legal_tools/ protection_of_water_facilities.pdf 
(visited August 23, 2003).
127 See, e.g., Yuzon, supra note 16, at 810-11.
Aaron Schwabach
July 13, 2004
Envtl. Damage in Yugoslavia
37
IV. Conclusion
The various environmental treaties to which Iraq is a party and customary international law 
regarding transboundary environmental harm provide little recourse for the Marsh Arabs, although 
they may provide the basis for claims to be pursued by neighboring states.  Conversely, however, 
the former Iraqi government is not likely to be exonerated on grounds of military necessity.
Of the treaties to which Iraq is a party, the Genocide Convention most clearly prohibits acts 
such as those committed by the Iraqi government against the Marsh Arabs.  Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions addresses individual murders and extrajudicial killings of Marsh Arabs, 
but probably does not address the problem of the destruction of the wetlands as a whole.  The 
Covenants on Economic and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights provide similar 
protections, and provide that a people may not be deprived of its means of subsistence, as the Marsh 
Arabs have been.
Treaties to which Iraq is not a party address the specific problem of environmental 
modification used in war or as an instrument of persecution of an ethnic group.  ENMOD and the 
Rome Statute prohibit environmental warfare of the type engaged in by Iraq, but it is unlikely that 
the provisions of either have been accepted as custom in the practice of states.  
Protocols I and II, however, are probably expressions of customary international law, and 
may even express jus cogens or non-derogable norms.  Of these, Protocol I addresses 
environmental harm far more directly.  Under Protocol I, the Iraqi government’s action against the 
southern Mesopotamian wetlands was illegal because its effects were widespread, long-lasting, and 
severe, and because it was a prohibited reprisal against the natural environment.  Under Protocol II, 
on the other hand, the action was only illegal if the wetlands were an “object” within the meaning 
of the convention, and also if the purpose of destroying the wetlands was to starve the Marsh Arabs, 
as opposed to causing them to leave or harming them in some other way.
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The Marsh Arabs will be eligible for the greater protection of Protocol I if they were 
engaged in a struggle against a racist regime.  While the Hussein government was not a racist 
regime in the traditional sense, the rift between the ruling minority and the Marsh Arabs may have 
been sufficient to bring the regime within the scope of the Protocol.
Even the smallest degree of military advantage during combat may be worth an enormous 
amount of post-war disapproval.  In addition, rebel soldiers are not likely to restrain their actions for 
military reasons; if they fail to achieve their military objectives and are defeated by the state against 
which they are fighting, they can expect to be imprisoned or executed in any event.  A trial for 
environmental war crimes is a remote concern.  The lack of any effective constraint on the rebel 
side may lead to a lack of restraint on the government side.
Balanced against this is self-interest: The territory the government is harming in a non-
international conflict is, ultimately, its own territory.  In addition to international disapproval, the 
offending government will bear the costs of the damage.
For the Marsh Arabs themselves, the future is uncertain.  Restoration projects are being 
discussed, but such projects will require a great deal of money that is not likely to be forthcoming 
while the political situation in Iraq remains unstable.  Even if restoration is funded, it is unlikely 
that the marshes can be fully returned to their original condition.  And by that time many of the 
Marsh Arabs may have drifted away, or perished, although some will doubtless return.128 In the 
meantime, the best way to prevent others from suffering a similar fate is to hold those responsible 
accountable under international law.
128
 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 8; Spoils of War, supra note 1; Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
